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Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°üµéÀÌ Àü·Ê¾ø´Â °­µµ·Î ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ¹Ý´ëÇÏ°í ³ª¼¹´Ù. voaÀÇ º¸µµ¸¦ ÀüÀçÇÑ´Ù.
  
  
  Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°üµéÀÌ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ ÀÛ¾÷À» °¡¼ÓÇÏ°Ú´Ù´Â Çѱ¹ ±¹¹æ ´ç±¹ÀÇ Áöħ¿¡ °Åµì ¿ì·Á¸¦ Ç¥Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¼º±ÞÇÑ ÀüȯÀÌ ÀÌ·ïÁö¸é Àü½Ã ¹Ì±º Æĺ´ ÀÇÁö¸¦ ²ª¾î Çѱ¹±ºÀº Áß±¹ÀÇ Áö¿øÀ» ¹Þ´Â ºÏÇѱº°úÀÇ ÀüÅõ¿¡¼­ ¿­¼¼¿¡ ³õÀÏ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â °æ°íÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ƯÈ÷ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ °ø°Ý¿¡ ´ëÇÑ º¸º¹ Ÿ°ÝÀº ¹Ì±ºÀÌ ÀüÀÛ±ÇÀ» °è¼Ó Çà»çµÅ¾ß¸¸ °¡´ÉÇÏ´Ù°í °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¹é¼º¿ø ±âÀÚ°¡ º¸µµÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°üÀº ¡°Çѱ¹Àº ÁֱDZ¹°¡·Î¼­ ¿øÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² ¹æ½ÄÀ¸·Îµç Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ¿¡ ¼Óµµ¸¦ ³¾ ±ÇÇÑ°ú ¿ª·®À» °®´Â´Ù¡±¸é¼­µµ ÀüȯÀÌ ½ÇÁ¦·Î ÀÌ·ïÁö¸é ¹Ì-ÇÑ µ¿¸Í°ú Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¾Èº¸¿¡ ½É°¢ÇÑ ±Õ¿­ÀÌ ¹ß»ýÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó¸ç ½ÅÁßÇÑ °áÁ¤À» Ã˱¸Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  º§ Àü »ç·É°üÀº VOA¿¡ º¸³½ ¼º¸í¿¡¼­, ¡®Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç(ÀüÀÛ±Ç) ÀüȯÀ» °¡¼ÓÈ­ÇØ ³ª°¥ °Í¡¯À̶ó´Â Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¡®2020³â ±¹¹æ¹é¼­¡¯ Áöħ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¡°¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÁöÈÖ Ã¼°è·ÎÀÇ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ °áÁ¤À» °ËÅäÇÑ µÚ ¼º±ÞÇÑ °áÁ¤À̾ú´Ù°í ÆÇ´ÜÇÒ °æ¿ì, ¹Ì±¹Àº ÀüÀï ¹ß¹ß ½Ã Çѹݵµ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹Ì±º Æĺ´¿¡ »ó´çÇÑ Á¦ÇÑÀ» µÑ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ Å©´Ù¡±°í °æ°íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü ¼º¸í] ¡°If the United States reviews any decision of the Republic of Korea to shift Operational Control of wartime operations to its leadership chain of command and determines that the decision is premature, the United States would very likely place significant restrictions on the employment of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula in wartime.¡±
  
  ¾Õ¼­ Çѱ¹ ±¹¹æºÎ´Â Áö³­ 2ÀÏ ¡¯2020³â ±¹¹æ¹é¼­'¿¡¼­ ¡°Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀ» °¡¼ÓÈ­ÇØ ³ª°¥ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. 2³â Àü ±¹¹æ¹é¼­ÀÇ ¡°ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ¾ÈÁ¤ÀûÀ¸·Î ÃßÁø Áß¡±À̶õ Ç¥Çöº¸´Ù ¡®¼Óµµ¡¯¸¦ °­Á¶ÇÑ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â Æò°¡°¡ ³ª¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù. ¿øÀÎö Çѱ¹ ÇÕÂüÀÇÀåµµ À̳¯ ¹Ì ÇÕÂüÀÇÀå°ú ÅëÈ­¿¡¼­ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ¡°°¡¼ÓÇÏ°Ú´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  º§ Àü »ç·É°üÀº ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¡°¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¼º±ÞÇÑ °áÁ¤¿¡ µû¸¥ Àü½ÃÀÛÀü±Ç Àüȯ °­Çà ¶§¹®¿¡ ¹Ì±º Æĺ´¿¡ Á¦ÇÑÀ» µÎ¸é ¿À·£ µ¿¸Í¿¡ ±Õ¿­ÀÌ »ý±â°í, Çѱ¹Àº ºÏÇÑ Á¤±Ç ¾Æ·¡ º¹¼ÓµÉ À§ÇèÀÌ Ä¿Áú °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¿ì·ÁÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°Áß±¹ÀÇ ÀüÀûÀÎ ´ëºÏ ±º»çÀû Áö¿øÀÌ º¸ÀåµÈ °¡¿îµ¥ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ µ¿¸Í ÆÄÆ®³Ê ¿ªÇÒ¿¡ ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ Àü³äÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù¸é, ºÏÇѱºÀº ±Ã±ØÀûÀ¸·Î ÀüÅõ¿¡¼­ Çѱ¹±ºÀ» °ÝÅðÇÒ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ Å©´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü ¼º¸í] ¡°If the United States places restrictions on the employment of its troops in wartime due to a premature decision by the Republic of Korea to force OPCON transfer, this would likely fracture the longtime Alliance and put the Korean people at great risk of falling under the north Korean regime. With the full military support of China assured, it is very likely the north Korean military would ultimately defeat Republic of Korean forces in battle, unless the United States is a fully committed Alliance partner.¡±
  
  Æ¯È÷, ¡°Çѱ¹Àº ÀüÅõ »óȲ¿¡¼­ ¹Ì±¹ ¿Ü¿¡´Â ÀüÅõ º´·ÂÀ» µ¿¿øÇÑ ¹æ¾î¸¦ Áö¿øÇÒ Áß¿äÇÑ µ¿¸ÍÀÌ ¾ø´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ¾ø´Ù¸é Çѱ¹Àº ºÏÇÑ¿¡ Ȧ·Î ¸Â¼­°Ô µÉ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ºÏÇÑÀº Áß±¹°ú ½ÉÁö¾î ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÀüÀûÀÎ Áö¿øÀ» ¾òÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¿ì·ÁÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü ¼º¸í] ¡°The Republic of Korea has no significant allies who would contribute to its defense with combat troops if hostilities break out, other than the United States. Without the United States, South Korea could very well be facing the north Koreans alone and the north would be fully backed by China and even perhaps Russia.¡±
  
  ¹«¾ùº¸´Ù ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇÙ¹«±â·Î ¹«ÀåÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ, Çѱ¹À̳ª ¹Ì±¹Àº Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ÃßÁøÇؼ­´Â ¾È µÇ°í, ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ¡®Çѱ¹À» À§ÇÑ ÇÙ¿ì»ê¡¯À» Á¦°øÇÏ´Â ÇÑ ÀüÅõ º´·Â¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±ÇÀº ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ³²¾ÆÀÖ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ÁÖÀåÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°ÀÌ´Â ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇÙ¹«±â·Î Çѹݵµ ȤÀº Çѹݵµ ÀαÙÀ» ¼±Á¦°ø°ÝÇÒ °æ¿ì ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Ç٠Ÿ°ÝÀ» °¡ÇÏ´Â ÀáÀçÀû ¿ä°ÇÀ» ºñ·ÔÇØ ¸ðµç ÀüÅõ ´É·Â ¿ä¼Ò¸¦ µ¿±âÈ­ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â À¯ÀÏÇÑ ¹æ¾È¡±À̶ó´Â Áø´ÜÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü ¼º¸í] ¡°No transfer of OPCON of wartime forces should be pursued by South Korea or the United States as long as north Korea is armed with nuclear Weapons. As long as the United States provides a "nuclear umbrella for the South", OPCON of military forces in combat must remain with the United States. This is the only way to synchronize all elements of combat power which includes the potential requirement for employment of a nuclear strike against the north by the United States should the north first use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or anywhere offshore.¡±
  
  ¶ÇÇÑ ¡°¾ïÁö·Â°ú ÀüÅõ·ÂÀº Çѱ¹°ú ¹Ì±¹ °£ °­·ÂÇÑ µ¿¸Í¿¡ ´Þ·ÁÀÖ´Ù¡±¸é¼­ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇÙÀ¸·Î ¹«ÀåÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ, Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿Í Çѱ¹¹ÎÀº ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Àü½Ã¿¡ Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ¿ÍÀÇ ÃæºÐÇÑ ÇùÀÇ¿Í Á¶Á¤À» ÅëÇØ ¸ðµç ±º»ç ÀÛÀüÀ» ±×´ë·Î ÁöÈÖÇÏ´Â °ÍÀ» ȯ¿µÇÏ°í µ¶·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í Ã˱¸Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü ¼º¸í] ¡°Deterrence and warfighting capability depends on a strong Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States. As long as the north is nuclear armed, the Government of South Korea and the South Korean people should welcome and encourage the United States to remain in command of all military operations in wartime with full consultation and coordination with the South Korean Government.¡±
  
  º§ Àü »ç·É°üÀº ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇÙ¹«±â·Î ¹«ÀåÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ, Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ÀüÀûÀ¸·Î ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ¿¬±âÇϱâ À§ÇØ ¹Ì±¹°úÀÇ ¾Èº¸ µ¿¸Í¿¡ Àü³äÇÒ °ÍÀ» Çѱ¹¿¡ °­·ÂÈ÷ ±Ç°íÇÑ´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ÀÌ´Â µ¿¸ÍÀÌ Çѹݵµ Àüü¸¦ Áö¹èÇÏ·Á´Â ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¾ß½ÉÀ» ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ÀúÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ÃÖ¼±ÀÇ ¹æ¾È¡±À̶ó°í °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [¹öÀ£ º§ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü] ¡°I strongly recommend that the Republic of Korea make a commitment to the Security Alliance with the United States to fully and completely postpone OPCON transfer as long as the north is armed with nuclear weapons. This is the very best way for the Alliance to continue to fully deter the north's ambitions for full dominance of the Korean Peninsula. OPCON transfer in a nuclear environment would be an historic mistake by the proud and heroic people of the Republic of Korea.¡±
  
  ±×·¯¸é¼­ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ º¸À¯ ȯ°æ¿¡¼­ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±ÇÀ» ÀüȯÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ÀÚ¶û½º·´°í ¿µ¿õÀûÀÎ Çѱ¹¹ÎÀÇ ¿ª»çÀû ½Ç¼ö°¡ µÉ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  º§ Àü »ç·É°üÀº Áö³­ 2013³â 4¿ù VOA¿¡ º¸³½ °ø½Ä ¼º¸íÀ» ÅëÇØ ¡®ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÇÙ °ø°Ý ´É·ÂÀ» °®Ãá ¸¸Å­, ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹Àº ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀÌ¾ç ³íÀǸ¦ ¿µ±¸ÀûÀ¸·Î ¹Ì·ï¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡¯´Â ÀÔÀåÀ» óÀ½ ¹àÈù µÚ ÁÙ°ð ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ ³íÀÇ°¡ ¹«ÀǹÌÇØÁ³´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇØ¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ÇÑÆí, Á¦ÀÓ½º ¼­¸Õ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°üÀº ¡°Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀº À§Çù°ú ÇöÁ¸ÇÏ´Â ÀûÀýÇÑ ¿ª·®¿¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃá Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°¹°·Ð ÀÌ·± ¿ª·®Àº ÈƷõǰí Áõ¸íµÅ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [Á¦ÀÓ½º ¼­¸Õ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü] ¡°OPCON transfer should be conditions based which is focused on the threat and having the right capabilities present. Of course this must be trained and demonstrated. The ROK and the US must be in agreement with these conditions. So I think there should be continuous examination of the overall Conditions in order to meet OPCON transfer.¡±
  
  ÀÌ¾î ¡°Çѱ¹°ú ¹Ì±¹Àº ÀÌ·± Á¶°Ç¿¡ ÇÕÀÇÇÑ ¸¸Å­, Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀ» ÃæÁ·Çϱâ À§ÇÑ Àü¹ÝÀûÀÎ Á¶°ÇÀ» °è¼Ó Á¡°ËÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í µ¡ºÙ¿´½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¼­¸Õ Àü »ç·É°üÀº ¡°Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç¿¡ ¼Óµµ¸¦ ³¾ ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀÖ´Ù¸é Çѱ¹°ú ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ¿¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Àü¹ÝÀûÀÎ Á¶°ÇÀ» Çö½ÇÀûÀ¸·Î Æò°¡ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í °Åµì °­Á¶Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  [Á¦Àνº ¼­¸Õ Àü Çѹ̿¬ÇÕ»ç·É°ü] ¡°If there is a need to accelerate there must be a realistic assessment done by the ROK and the US on the overall conditions that are needed for OPCON to occur. I would caution against a time driven transition.¡±
  
  ¾Õ¼­ ¼­¸Õ Àü »ç·É°üÀº Áö³­ÇØ 9¿ù ·Î¹öÆ® ¿¡À̺귳½º ÁÖÇѹ̱º»ç·É°üÀÌ ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ Á¶°ÇÀ» ÃæÁ·½ÃÅ°±â À§Çؼ± ¡°¾ÆÁ÷ °¥ ±æÀÌ ¸Ö´Ù¡±°í ¾ð±ÞÇßÀ» ¶§µµ VOA¿¡ ¡°Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀº Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ÇÕÀÇÇÑ Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±â¹ÝÀ» µÐ °Í¡±À̶ó¸ç ¡°³»°¡ 2013³â Çѱ¹À» ¶°³­ ÀÌ·¡ °è¼Ó ±×·¡¿Ô°í, ÀÌ·± ¿øÄ¢Àº 2015³â¿¡µµ ´Ù½Ã ÇÑ ¹ø °ËÅäµÆ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
  
  ¼­¸Õ Àü »ç·É°üÀÇ ¼³¸íÀº ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ÀÌ ÃßÁø ÁßÀÎ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀº Áö³­ 2015³â ¾ç±¹ ±¹¹æÀå°üÀÌ ¼­¸íÇÑ ¡®Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ °èȹ(COTP)¡¯¿¡ ±âÃʸ¦ µ×À¸¸ç, ƯÁ¤ ½Ã±â¸¦ Á¤Çسõ°í ÀüÀÛ±ÇÀ» µ¹·Á¹Þ´Â °Ô ¾Æ´Ï¶ó Á¤ÇسõÀº Á¶°ÇÀ» ´Þ¼ºÇؾ߸¸ °¡´ÉÇÏ´Ù´Â ¿øÄ¢À» »ó±â½ÃÄ×½À´Ï´Ù.
  
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  Çѱ¹Àº ÁֱDZ¹°¡·Î¼­ ¿øÇÏ´Â ¾î¶² ¹æ½ÄÀ¸·Îµç Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ¿¡ ¼Óµµ¸¦ ³¾ ±ÇÇÑ°ú ¿ª·®À» °®´Â´Ù. Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç ÀüȯÀº Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¿øÇÏ´Â °ÅÀÇ ¾î´À ¶§³ª °¡´ÉÇÏÁö¸¸, °áÁ¤ÀÌ ³»·ÁÁö±â Àü¿¡ ´ÙÀ½°ú °°Àº Çö½ÇÀÌ ½ÅÁßÈ÷ °í·ÁµÅ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.
  
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  As a sovereign nation the Republic of Korea has the authority and capability of speeding up OPCON transfer in any way it desires. While this transfer of Operational Control in wartime can be done almost anytime the Republic of Korea desires, the following realities should be considered carefully before any decision is made.
  
  a. If the United States reviews any decision of the Republic of Korea to shift Operational Control of wartime operations to its leadership chain of command and determines that the decision is premature, the United States would very likely place significant restrictions on the employment of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula in wartime. If the United States places restrictions on the employment of its troops in wartime due to a premature decision by the Republic of Korea to force OPCON transfer, this would likely
  
  fracture the longtime Alliance and put the Korean people at great risk of falling under the north Korean regime. With the full military support of China assured, it is very likely the north Korean military would ultimately defeat Republic of Korean forces in battle, unless the United States is a fully committed Alliance partner.
  
  b. The Republic of Korea has no significant allies who would contribute to its defense with combat troops if hostilities break out, other than the United States. Without the United States, South Korea could very well be facing the north Koreans alone and the north would be fully backed by China and even perhaps Russia.
  
  c. No transfer of OPCON of wartime forces should be pursued by South Korea or the United States as long as north Korea is armed with nuclear Weapons. As long as the United States provides a "nuclear umbrella for the South", OPCON of military forces in combat must remain with the United States. This is the only way to synchronize all elements of combat power which includes the potential requirement for employment of a nuclear strike against the north by the United States should the north first use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or anywhere offshore. Deterrence and warfighting capability depends on a strong Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States. As long as the north is nuclear armed, the Government of South Korea and the South Korean people should welcome and encourage the United States to remain in command of all military operations in wartime with full consultation and coordination with the South Korean Government.
  
  d. I strongly recommend that the Republic of Korea make a commitment to the Security Alliance with the United States to fully and completely postpone OPCON transfer as long as the north is armed with nuclear weapons. This is the very best way for the Alliance to continue to fully deter the north's ambitions for full dominance of the Korean Peninsula. OPCON transfer in a nuclear environment would be an historic mistake by the proud and heroic people of the Republic of Korea.
  
  
[ 2021-02-10, 20:50 ]
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